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THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF GENERAL WELFARE
Let us examine into the meaning of the terms "public
welfare," "general welfare," "common good," and other
terms of like or similar import. They are often linked with
a consideration of that most important power known as the
police power. Without a thorough comprehension of them,
how adequate or sociologically useful may an understanding
of that power be? Or an understanding of the organic law?
Or, indeed, for that matter, an understanding of the positive
law in any of its branches? And in these times of great eco-
nomic stress and strain and great political upheaval and un-
rest, such terms flow frequently from lip and pen.
We speak herein of such terms as "general welfare" and
"public good" as employed without qualification. Moreover,
as to those or any other expressions we may use in this
article, our purpose is not so much to form definitions as to
gain concepts. We may gain useful concepts even though,
because of the limitations and uncertainties and circumlo-
cutions of language, we may have to content ourselves with
not altogether satisfactory definitions or use some particular
term with different meanings in different connections. "The
poverty of language often compels the employment of terms
in quite different significations." 1
What help have the courts had from the lexicographers
in determining the meaning of the adjective "public"?
"The Century Dictionary defines it as: 'Of or belonging
to the people at large; relating to or affecting the whole peo-
ple of a state, nation or community; not limited or restricted
to any particular class of the community.' The New Inter-
national defines it as: 'Of or pertaining to the people; relat-
ing to or affecting a nation, state or community at large.'
1 Texas v. White, 74 U. S. 700, 720, 19 L. ed. 227, 236 (1868).
2 Cawker v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 325, 133 N. W. 157, 159, 37 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 510 (1911).
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"Mr. Webster says that 'in general, public expresses some-
thing common to mankind at large, to a nation, state, city
or town, and is opposed to private, which denotes what be-
longs to an individual, to a family, to a company, or a cor-
poration.' "8
The expressions "common welfare," "general welfare"
and "public welfare" are synonymous.4 "General" means
"having a relation to all," "common to the whole." I "Com-
mon" means "participated in by two or more persons."
"Common" is defined thus: "Pertaining to, belonging to, or
participated in by two or more persons, things, or parts
alike; participating in or appertaining to all or the whole;
joint; general; public." 6 The three words "common," "gen-
eral" and "public" bear upon the meaning of one another
as modifiers of the noun "welfare," with the result that it
makes no difference which of the three is used in the modi-
fication of that particular noun.
"The word 'common' is ordinarily understood to apply to
the general public, when not qualified by some word or
phrase of limitation. The term 'general benefits,' when un-
qualified, should probably be accepted in the same sense as
the term 'common benefits'; that is to say, when there is no
limitation expressed, it should be deemed applicable to the
general public, rather than as embracing, as general, but a
limited part of the public." 7
That which is for the general (public, common) welfare
is, of course, for the general (public, common) benefit or
good; hence the synonymy of such expressions as "general
8 Chamberlain v. City of Burlington, 19 Iowa 395, 403 (1865).
4 Stockton v. Williams, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 546, 570 (1895); Kirkendall v.
City of Omaha, 39 Neb. 1, 6, 57 N. W. 752, 754 (1894); Aymette v. The State,
2 Humph. (Tenn.) 154, 158 (1840); Spokane Traction Co. v. Granath, 42 Wash.
506, 512, 85 Pac. 261, 264 (1906).
5 Vide Koen v. State, infra note 34.
6 NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY.
7 Kirkendall v. City of Omaha, 39 Neb. 1, 6, 57 N. W. 752, 754 (1894),
cited note 4, supra, quoted, Spokane Traction Co. v. Granath, 42 Wash. 506, 512,
85 Pac. 261, 264 (1906), cited note 4, supra.
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[public, common] welfare," "common [public, general]
good," "public [general, common] benefit," etc., may be
assumed without argument.
If "public" means something "common to mankind at
large," and, therefore, public welfare is the welfare of man-
kind at large, does that mean the welfare of all mankind,
the welfare of mankind throughout the world, the world-
welfare, the welfare of the world-community?-or how else
should one express the thought? Certainly, that welfare has
so far been for the most part beyond the scope and concern
of municipal law. Perhaps never more so than it is right now.
However, a welfare common to mankind at large could be no
other than a welfare extending to every man, woman and
child in the world. "Mankind at large" does not mean man-
kind considered as an entity, but as, rather, a collectivity,
and so with a regard for every individual in the world. "At
large" signifies "diffusely" or "fully" or "in the full extent." 8
If "public" means "of or pertaining to the people," pub-
lic welfare is the welfare of the people. If "public" means
"of or belonging to the people at large," public welfare is
the welfare of the people at large. Is there any difference be-
tween "the welfare of the people" and "the welfare of the
people at large"? If "public" means something "common...
to a nation, state, city or town," in what sense are we
to take nation, state, city or town in order that a thing
may be common to it? If "public" means something "relat-
ing to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation or com-
munity," is there a difference between "the welfare of the
people" and "the welfare of the whole people"? Is a com-
munity different from a state or nation? From a city or-
town? If "public" means "something relating to or affecting
a nation, state or community at large," is there a difference
between, say, "the welfare of a nation" and "the welfare
of a nation at large"?
8 WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTONARY.
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It is evident that to add "at large" to such expressions as
"the welfare of the people," "the welfare of the nation,"
etc., is only to emphasize both a necessary inclusiveness and
a necessary distributiveness in each of those expressions. It
is most obvious that such must be the case as far as "the
welfare of the people" is concerned. Such welfare must ex-
tend to no fewer than the full number of those who are mem-
bers of the people, and yet somehow touch every one of
them individually. "People" does not, in "welfare of the
people," denote a mere artificial person. We cannot speak
of a welfare common to one person, natural or artificial.
And a welfare common to a nation, state or city (to add
"at large" to "nation," "state" or "city" but emphasizes the
thought) can be no*other than a welfare common to the
people (people at large) of such nation, state or city. The
"at large" in "welfare of the people at large" does not add
anything to, but merely emphasizes something in, the ex-
pression "the welfare of the people"--the thought that' hu-
man beings are involved, and distributively as well as col-
lectively involved; that public welfare is human welfare,
and of such sort that it touches the interests of every hu-
man being in the collectivity in question. In connection with
the public (common, general) welfare, or welfare of the Peo-
ple (people at large), it is evident that artificial persons
(corporations and quasi-corporations) can play no part and:
must receive no consideration as ends in themselves but 6nly
as means to the end of.human welfare, and are to be fostered
and encouraged when they serve that end, discouraged or.,
destroyed when they oppose it. The public welfare is es-
sentially a welfare of natural persons.
It would seem that "whole" prefixed to "people" has the
same effect as "at large" following it.' "When we use the
word whole, we refer to a thing as made up of parts none of
which are wanting." 'o Consequently, "anything relating to
9 Vide Dupee v. Swigert, 127 UlI. 494, 499, 21 N. E. 622, 623 (1889).
10 WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DIc ONARY.
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or affecting the whole people," like anything "of or belong-
ing to the people at large," affects no fewer than should be
considered members of the people, and at the same time
affects individually, in some manter and to some degree,
every person whom the people includes. Either "whole" or
"at large" indicates a distribution and its extent.
It is quite obvious that we have not yet asked all the
questions that could be raised on the basis of the judicially
quoted definitions of "public." This is particularly true in
connection with the meaning of "public" in the term "pub-
lic welfare." If public welfare is the welfare of the people,
just what limitations are we to attach to what the term
"people" denotes in this connection? Are the people of a
city all of mankind within the physicail bounds of a city?
Only a certain part of mankind within those bounds? If so,
what part? Do the people of a city include any part of man-
kind beyond such bounds? If so, what part? We may ask
like questions about the people of a nation, the people of a
state, the people of a township, the people of any commu-
nity.
Then let us ask our questions in another way. Who are
the people of a community? Those who, wherever they may
be, within or without its physical bounds, are affiliated to
the government of the community? Those who, whoever
they may be, affiliated or not affiliated to its government,
are within the community's physical bounds? Or only those
who are within such bounds and so affiliated? An affirmative
answer to the first question is in order. A government exists
primarily for the welfare of those who are affiliated to it-
they are the people, the public, the body politic, of the geo-
graphical area which is under that government. Any person
who is affiliated to that government is of the people of that
community, though beyond the community's physical
bounds." Whoever is within those bounds but not affiliated
to the government which prevails there, is amenable to that
11 Vide Quinby v. Duncan, 4 Harr. (Del.) 383, 384 (1846).
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government but not of the people of that community. He is
in the community considered in its physical aspect (geo-
graphical area) and among the assemblage of persons there,
but not of the community considered in its political aspect--
not of the body politic, the people.
"The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens'
are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both
describe the political body, who, according to our republican
constitutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power
and conduct the government through their representatives.
They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and
every citizen is one of this people and a constituent member
of this sovereignty." 12
Of course, like almost every other word, the term "people"
varies in meaning, but what we may call its point-of-depart-
ure meaning identifies the term with the word "citizens."
It has been said that " 'all words, whether they be in deeds
or statutes, or otherwise, if they be general and not express
and precise, shall be restrained unto the fitness of the mat-
ter or person.' "1
"This word [people] is a comprehensive one, and is, of
course, subject to many different meanings, depending al-
ways upon the connection in which it is used, and the sub-
ject-matter to which it relates." "I Sometimes, for instance,
it means the electorate. 5
12 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 393, 404, 15 L. ed. 691, 700 (1856), quoted,
Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 159, 12 Sup. Ct. 375, 381, 36 L. ed.
103, 109 (1891); In re Silkman, 88 App. Div. 102, 109, 84 N. Y. S. 1025, 1030
(1903).
13 Union Hotel Co. v. Hersee, 79 N. Y. 454, 461, 35 Am. St. Rep. 536, 537
(1879), citing Bacon's Maxims of the Law, Regula X, quoted, In re Silkman,
8. App. Div. 102, 109, 84 N. Y. S. 1025, 1030 (1903), cited note 12, supra.
14 The Itata, 56 Fed. 505,.511, 5 C. C. A. 608, 631 (1893). Et vide: United
States v. The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1, 62, 17 Sup. Ct. 495, 41 L. ed. 897, 918
(1896); Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 617, 15 N. W. 609, 616 (1883).
15 Town of Walnut v. Wade, 106 U. S. 683, 693-4, 26 L. ed. 526, 530 (1880);
People v. Counts, 89 Cal. 15, 22, 26 Pac. 612, 614 (1891); Tolbert v. Long, 134
Ga. 292, 296, 67 S. E. 826, 828, 137 Am. St. Rep. 222, 225 (1910); Heuser v.
Harris, 42 II. 425, 432 (1867) ; Beverly v. Sabin, 20 Ill. 357, 362 (1858) ; Rogers
v. Jacob, 88 Ky. 502, 505, 11 S. W. 513, 514 (1889); In re Opinion of the Justices,
226 Mass. 607, 611, 115 N. E. 921, 922 (1917); Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63, 75,
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Obviously, the welfare of the people can not be confined
to the welfare of the electorate. Nor can it be confined to
the welfare of the government. The govermnnt is but the
agent of the people,16 and, according to the point-of-depart-
ure general meaning of the term "state," the government is
but one, as the people another, of the factors which the state
comprises. Basically, the term "state" represents "the com-
bined idea of people, territory and government," but the
term may mean any one of these, the most fundamental of
which is "people." "It [state] describes sometimes a people
or community of individuals united more or less closely in
political relations, inhabiting temporarily or permanently
the same country; often it denotes only the country or ter-
ritorial region, inhabited by such a community; not infre-
quently it is applied to the government under which the peo-
ple live; at other times it represents the combined idea of
people, territory, and government," 11 "It is not difficult to
see that in all these senses the primary conception is that
of a people or community." 18 "In one sense it signifies the
territory inhabited by the people; in the other it means the
body politic inhabiting the territory," and the latter, "the
community as a body politic," is the primary and leading
sense of the term "state." 19
97 Am. Dec. 248, 257 (1867); Bryan v. City of Lincoln, 50 Neb. 620, 622, 70
N. W. 252, 35 L. R. A. 752, 753 (1897); State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 723, 48
N. W. 739, 750 (1891); State v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N. M. 576, 587, 249
Pac. 242, 247 (1926); In re Incurring of State Debts, 19 R. I. 610, 612, 37 At.
14, 15 (1896); Simkin v. City of Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 185, 237 Pac. 245,
251 (1925).
16 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 290, 5 Sup. Ct. 914, 29 L. ed.
185, 192 (1884); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 Fed. (2d) 396, 400
(1927); Grunert v. Spalding, 78 N. W. 606, 613 (Wis. 1899); Grunert v. Spalding,
104 Wis. 193, 212, 80 N. W. 589 (1899).
17 Texas v. White, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720, 19 L. ed. 227, 236 (1868),
cited note 1, supra.
1 Op. cit. supra note 17.
19 State v. Wilmington City Council, 3 Harr. (Del.) 294, 299 (1840),
quoted, Long v. Ross, 132 Ga. 288, 299, 64 S. E. 84, 85 (1909). Et vide: Lehigh
Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 Fed. (2d) 396, 400 (1927), cited note 16,
supra; Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 295 Fed. 372, 375 (1923); Crow v. State, 14 Mo. 237, 265 (1851);
Montana Auto F. Corp. v. British & Fed. Underwriters, 72 Mont. 69, 74, 232
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"The word 'people' may have somewhat varying signifi-
cations dependent upon the connection in which it is used.
In some connections in the Constitution [of Massachusetts]
it is confined to citizens and means the same as citizens. It
excludes aliens. It includes men, women and children. It
comprehends not only the sane, competent, law-abiding and
educated, but also those who are wholly or in part depend-
ents and charges upon society by reason of immaturity,
mental or moral deficiency or lack of the common essentials
of education. All these persons are secured by the fundamen-
tal guarantees of the Constitution in life, liberty and prop-
erty and the pursuit of happiness, except as they may be
limited for the protection of society. It is declared in the
Preamble to our Constitution that:
"'The body politic is formed by a voluntary association
of individuals: it is a social compact, by which the whole
people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with
the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws
for the common good.'
"In this sense 'people' comprises many who, by reason of
want of years, of capacity or of the educational requirements
of article 20 of the Amendments of the Constitution, can
have no voice in government and who yet are entitled to all
the immunities and protection established by the Constitu-
tion. 'People' in this aspect is coextensive with the body
politic." 20
Various sorts of noncitizens have been deemed not to be
members of "the people." 21
Pac. 198, 199 (1924); State v. Field, 31 N. M. 120, 175, 241 Pac. 1027, 1049
(1925); Ex parte Corliss, 16 N. D. 470, 511, 114 N. W. 962, 980 (1907); Union
Bank v. Hill, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 325, 330 (1866).
20 In re Opinion of the Justices, 226 Mass. 607, 611, 115 N. E. 921, 922
(1917), cited note 15, supra. Et vide: Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U. S.
135, 158, 36 L. ed. 103, 108 (1891) cited note 12, supra; United States -v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 549, 23 L. ed. 588, 590 (1875).
21 Aliens in general: In re Opinion of the Justices, op. cit. supra note 15;
In re Silkman, 88 App. Div. 102, 109, 84 N. Y. S. 1025, 1031 (1903), cited note
12, supra.
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Hence "people" does not equal "inhabitants" as the latter
word is used in its broadest sense.22 However, in certain con-
nections (i. e., context considered) "the people" may mean
all persons who are within certain geographical limits.23
That "the people" are those affiliated to a given govern-
ment becomes quite obvious when certain questions arise
concerning the rights, privileges and immunities which, pur-
suant to the Federal Constitution, the states of the United
States should accord to one another's citizens, or concern-
ing alienage and the right or privilege of coming into or re-
maining within the United States or of holding or acquiring
certain interests here. Aside from the observance of limits
set by constitution, treaty or international law, as the case
may be, the extent to which the United States or one of our
states precludes itself from advancing its own welfare with-
out regard for the welfare of those who are not members of
the community depends upon the intellectual and the moral
qualities of those who are its members.
Can "the welfare of the people" mean the welfare of the
people as a unit? We have already answered the question,
in effect. But we may answer the question further by asking
another. May the welfare of a corporation (a business cor-
poration, let us say) mean exclusively the welfare of the
corporation as an entity, an artificial person-its welfare
unconnected with the welfare of its members, the stock-
holders? It is idle, in trying to posit the welfare of the
Members of the Indian tribes: Scott v. Sandford, op. cit. supra note 12;
The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U. S. 1, 8 L. ed. 25 (1831);
Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53, 81 Am. Dec. 376 (1862); In re Silkman, 88
App. Div. 102, 109, 84 N. Y. S. 1025, 1031 (1903), cited note 12, supra.
Slaves: Scott v. Sandford, op. cit. supra note 12; In re Silkman, 88 App. Div.
102, 109, 84 N. Y. S. 1025, 1031 (1403), cited note 12, supra.
22 Quinby v. Duncan, 4 Harr. (Del.) 383, 384 (1846), cited note 11, supra;
In re Silkman, 88 App. Div. 102, 110, 84 N. Y. S. 1025, 1030 (1903), cited note
12, supra.
23 Rushton v. Woodham, 68 S. C. 110, 46 S. E. 943, 944 (1904); Rossmiller
v. State, 114 Wis. 169, 187, 89 N. W. 839, 844, 58 L. R. A. 93, 99, 91 Am. St.
Rep. 910, 920 (1902). Et vide State of Ohio v. Trustees of Section 29, etc., 11
Ohio 24, 27 (1841).
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people as a unit, to think of such welfare as if it could be
divorced, in substance and reality, from the individual wel-
fare of every member of the community, notwithstanding
that upon some of the citizens the public welfare might re-
flect, in some respects, only indirect and remote individual
welfare.
As to the term "community," it would seem that it may
well be used as a generic term applicable to nation, state,
city, township, etc.24 The term means: "The people who re-
side in one locality and are subject to the same laws, or have
the same interests, etc.; a body politic, whether village, town,
city or state; hence, the public, society at large." 25 "Com-
munity," by which we sometimes indicate the "combined
idea," whether in connection with the nation on the one
hand or the township on the other, seems to emphasize "the
people" in the people-territory-government trinity.2" Even
the word "state" sometimes means simply "people," 27 and
the welfare of the state can in reality be no other than the
welfare of its people.
Since the use to which we are putting the term "com-
munity" is clear, we shall not quibble over whether there
may be citizens of, say, a township.' One may be affiliated
24 Vide: United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1, 56, 17 Sup. Ct.
495, 41 L. ed. 897, 916 (1896), cited note 14, supra; Texas v. White, 74 U. S.
700, 721, 19 L. ed. 227, 236 (1868), cited note 1, supra; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v.
State of Russia, 21 Fed. (2d) 396, 400 (1927); The Lucy H., 235 Fed. 610, 612
(1916); State v. Wilmington City Council, 3 Harr. (Del.) 294, 299 (1840); Ex
parte Corliss, 16 N. D. 470, 511, 114 N. W. 962, 980 (1907); State v. White &
Chiles, 25 Tex. 465, 595 (1868); O'Connor ;.. State, 71 S. W. 409, 410 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1902).
25 NEw STASWm DicroqARY.
20 Vide Texas v. White, 74 U. S. 700, 720, 19 L. ed. 227, 236 k1868), cited
note 1, supra.
27 Texas v. White, 74 U. S. 700, 720, 19 L. ed. 227, 236 (1868), cited note
24, supra; Tevis v. Randall, 6 Cal. 632, 635, 65 Am. Dec. 547 (1856), quoted,
People v. Love, 19 Cal. 676, 681 (1862) ; Brown v. The State,, 5 Colo. 496, 499
(1881); W., St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. The People, 105 Il1. 236, 240 (1883); Crow
v. State, 14 Mo. 237, 264 (1851), cited note 19, supra; The Union Bank v.
C. A. Hill, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 325, 330 (1866).
28 Vide: State v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N. M. 576, 587, 249 Pac. 242
(1926) (Reference to "citizen of the City of Albuquerque."); Union Hotel Co. v.
Hersee, 79 N. Y. 454, 35 Am. Rep. 536 (1879) (Meaning of "citizen of Buffalo,"
context considered.) ; cases cited, 11 C. J. 774, footnotes 15-17, 21.
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at the same time to the government of. a city or village, the
government of a township, the government of one of our
states or territories, and the government of the nation, thus
belonging, in a way, to four "peoples," each with a general
welfare peculiar to itself. "The powers which are exercised
by a city government are, it thus appears, superadded to
those exercised by the state in the same locality. The peo-
ple of towns and cities are governed that much more than
are the people of the state generally." 29
We may, then, state the meaning of "public welfare" by
saying that it means the welfare of all who are of a given
jolitical community such as a city, a state or the United
States. We say not "community" merely, but "political com-
munity"--political community such as a city, a state or the
United States. A political party or economic class is not such
a community.
Are we not at a point where we may safely designate the
public welfare, simply and briefly, as the welfare of all?
We realize perfectly that this is open to an objection sim-
ilar to one made to the definition of a jus in rem as a right
against all. "Sometimes a right exists only as against one
or more individuals, capable of being ascertained and named;
sometimes it exists generally against all persons, members
of the same political society as the person to whom the right
belongs; or, as is commonly said, somewhat arrogantly, it
exists against the world at large." 1o When we speak of the
general welfare as the welfare of all, and mean anything
less than the welfare of the whole world, we speak "some-
what arrogantly." But the phrase "welfare of all" is no more-
likely to be misunderstood than is the phrase "right against
all," which has not been misapprehended, either in itself
29 Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569, 584 (1859), quoted, Long v. Rose, 132
Ga. 288, 294, 64 S. E. 84, 86 (1909).
30 MARKBY, ELEMENTS O" LAW (6th ed.) § 164; cf. Remarks about the
"whole world" in Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 156, 9 -Am. St. Rep. 328,
331 (1888).
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or in its application. Nor, if we define general welfare as the
welfare of all, is there any serious danger that the "all" will
not be taken to be at least as extensive as the sort of com-
munal all of which we have been speaking.
"All," it seems, points to every one in, excludes no one
from, the body to which, as noun or adjective, it refers. "A
more comprehensive word than 'all' cannot be found in the
English language. . .' sl "All," whether used as adjective
or noun, may refer to "the whole collectively considered"
("the complete totality") or to "the whole distributively
considered." 82 "All" as a noun, and likewise "all" as an
adjective, does double duty, being allied in meaning with the
collective noun totus (cf. the adjectives cunctus and uni-
versus) of the Latin, and being also allied; in meaning, with
the Latin distributive adjective omnis. "One of the defini-
tions given the word 'all' by the Standard Dictionary is
'the entire number of, each individual or member being
taken separately,' and under the word 'distributive' the
Standard also says '"all" and "every" are distributive
words.' From this it appears that 'all' has a distributive as
well as a collective meaning." 3s
A distinction is taken, in certain connections, between
"general" and "universal." "The fourth and fifth definitions
given by Webster of the word 'general,' as an adjective,
are as follows: 'Common to many, or the greatest num-
ber; widely spread; prevalent; extensive; though not uni-
versal; as, a general opinion; a general custom. (5) Hav-
ing a relation to all; common to the whole; as "Adam, our
general sire." Milton.' And the synonym as follows: '"Com-
mon" denotes primarily that in which many share; and
31 Moore v. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 28 Gratt. 508, 516, 26 Am. St.
Rep. 373, 375 (1877). Et vide Pittsburgh, C. C., & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lightheiser,
163 Ind. 247, 259, 71 N. E. 218, 222 (1904).
32 NEW STANDARD DCTIoNARY.
33 Young v. Du Bois, 60 Misc. Rep. 381, 113 N. Y. S. 456, 457 (1908). Et
vide Heitman v. Commercial Bank of Savannah, 6 Ga. App. 584, 598, 65 S. E.
590, 597 (1909).
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hence that which is often met with. "General" is stronger,
denoting that which pertains to a majority of the individuals
which compose a genus or whole. "Universal," that which
pertains to all without exception. To be able to read and
write is so common in this country that we may pronounce
it "general," though by no means "universal." ' "14
If the distinction between "general" and "universal" were
good in connection with the term "general welfare," general
welfare would be less than the welfare of all the members
of a community. It would be merely a welfare extensive or
widespread but not all-embracing. General welfare, to be
public, or common, welfare, can not be distinguished from,
but must be identified with, a welfare which (again we
speak "somewhat arrogantly") is universal. Although we
may speak of the general welfare of a class, such welfare is
precisely one of the things we do not mean when, without
qualification, we speak of general welfare. The welfare of
an individual or a class may be quite in line with general
welfare, but is not, by itself, the general welfare.
That which, in one aspect, is the welfare of only one,
may in another aspect be the welfare of every one. That
which is directly for the welfare of a few may bring welfare
indirectly to all others, so that, in the ultimate, the wel-.
fare of all is promoted. So, even though an act confers a
direct benefit upon an individual or a class, if the object
of the act is to benefit, not the individual or the class, but
the public at large (all individuals), the object of the act
is general welfare. There is a decided difference between an
act which has for its sole object the benefit of an individual
or class and an act which benefits an individual or class
with a view to achieving the ultimate benefit of the public
-between an individual or class benefit as an end in itself
and such a benefit as a means to a public end.
34 Koen v. State, 35 Neb. 676, 678, 53 N. W. 595, 596, 17 L. R. A. 821,
822 (1892). Et vide Puget Sound Pub. Co. v. Times Printing Co., 33 Wash. 551,
558, 74 Pac. 802, 805 (1903).
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Not in direct connection with "welfare," but nevertheless
with results serviceable to us in that connection, courts have
called lexicographers to their aid in taking a distinction
between "general" and "special."
"The terms 'general' and 'special' are antonyms ...
"'General. a. . .. 2. Pertaining to the majority; com-
mon to the greatest number, but not to all; true of a large
number or proportion; widespread or prevalent, as dis-
tinguished from universal; as, a general practice; general
rainfall.' Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary, p.
1018.
"'Special. a. 1. Having in a peculiar and distinguish-
ing degree some characteristic or characteristics; out of the
ordinary; singular or unique; express; particular; as, a
special reduction; special favor; special care. . . . 4. Per-
taining to one or. more individuals, as distinguished from
the class to which they belong; logically singular; individ-
ual; as, what is your special business?' Id. p. 2331." "
"The terms ["general" and "special"] are antonyms.
'General' is defined in Webster's International Dictionary
as follows: ' (4) Common to mapny, or the greatest number;
widely spread; prevalent; extensive though not universal.'
The same eminent authority defines 'special' thus: '(2)
Particular; peculiar; different from others .... (3) ... De-
signed for a particular purpose .... (4) Limited in range;
confined to a definite field of action....
If " general," in the sense of widespread merely, is the
antonym of "special," "general" in the arrogant sense of
"universal" is, a fortiori, such an antonym. And if "public...
is opposed to private," " so, of course is "general" as mean-
ing "public."
85 Steele-Smith Dry Goods Co. v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., 15
Ala. App. 271, 274, 73 So. 215, 216 (1916).
86 Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. 75, 63 N. E. 594, 595 (1902).
37 Chamberlain v. City of Burlington, op. cit. supra note 3.
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A statement that "general" and "special" are anto-
nyms or that "public" is opposed to "private" must be re-
ceived with caution, at least so far as the application of
these adjectives to "welfare," "good," etc., is concerned.
If it is permissible to say that the special benefit of a street
improvement spells a measure of special welfare, such wel-
fare is in line with any benefit which the public as a whole
may gain from the improvement-a benefit identifiable
with general welfare. If it is permissible to say that the
private ownership of property spells a measure of private
welfare, that welfare may certainly be compatible with the
welfare we call "public." "Public," "common," and "gen-
eral" are not, as a rule, identical in meaning, although, as
we have seen, they have the same meaning in modification
of "welfare," "good," etc. Are such words as "particular,"
"special," "private," etc., identical in meaning? As a rule?
In modification of "welfare," "good," etc.? Since every one
has a concern in the general welfare, to what extent, if any,
after all, are we justified in speaking of a particular or a
special or a private welfare in connection with something
that is detrimental to the welfare of the public? Answers
to these and similar questions lie outside of the scope of this
article.
The expression general welfare, as we have seen, con-
cerns many individuals and classes-all. Moreover, it re-
lates to many and diverse matters. General (public, com-
mon) welfare undoubtedly embraces every matter which,
with respect to any interest, whatever it may be (e. g., any
social, political or economic interest), involves the welfare
of all who are of a given community.
"As our civic life has developed, so has the definition of
'public welfare' until it has been held to embrace regulations
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'to promote the economic welfare, public convenience, and
general welfare of the community.' "s According to the
phraseology of the passage we have just quoted, it would
seem that the general welfare is but part of, instead of the
same as, the public welfare, .but, in spite of the phraseology,
the basic idea intended to be conveyed by the passage is
entirely clear.
"The public welfare embraces a variety of interests call-
ing for public care and control. These are: 'The primary
social interests of safety, order and morals; economic in-
terests; and non-material and political interests.' "89
The police power has been said to be "the law of over-
ruling necessity, for the preservation of the general wel-
fare," "0 and many police-power cases serve to demonstrate
that the fundamental object of the exercise of the power is
the promotion of the welfare of the community as a whole,
through the removal or prevention of detriments or dangers
that threaten or beset it as a whole, and that questions of
general welfare touch upon a great variety of interests.4
"The power has always been as broad as the public welfare
and as strong as the arm of the state." 42 The phrase "gen-
eral welfare" is, therefore, as it has been called, "a very
broad one." 48
88 Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 Pac. 381, 383
(1925), quoted, Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 115 Neb. 525, 532,
213 N. W. 835, 838 (1927).
89 State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co., 168 Iowa 1, 10, 147 N. W. 195, 199,
L. R. A. 1917B, 198, 202 (1914), quoting FpDuND, PoracE PoWvm, § § 9, 15.
40 Cook County v. City of Chicago, 311 111. 234, 247, 142 N. E. 512, 516,
31 A. L. R. 449 (1924).
41 E. g.: Cases cited, 12 C. J. 921, footnote 66; also, Nebbia v. People, 54
Sup. Ct. 505 (1934), and cases cited therein.
42 State v. Mountain Timber Co., 7S Wash. 581, 588, 135 Pac. 645, 648
(1913).
48 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 364, 50 S. W.
(2d) 960, 961 (1932).
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The difficulty of determining whether a thing is hostile
to the public interest is often very great, but can never be
admitted to be too great for the legislator or the judge. Nor
let the judge say he does not make law. He does not make
written law (legislation), but he is continually interpreting
the written law and often must declare whether a written
law is constitutional. Within certain limits, then, he can
mould the law according to criterion. What better criterion
can he or the legislator have than that of the general wel-
fare?-a criterion that is as sociologically useful as it is
ethically sound!
Vernon A. Vrooman.
Drake University.
